Platform status
Generated by
tools/traceability/trace.py buildfrom the kit matrix,docs/implementation/traceability.yamland the evidence recorded indocs/implementation/evidence/results/. Do not edit by hand.
Latest recorded evidence: 2026-11-01T14:15:21+00:00.
A PASSED status requires a green, current evidence run with no residual work and no blocker. The other statuses state honestly what is missing.
- P0 requirements: 0 PASSED / 269
- All requirements: 0 PASSED / 355
By domain
| Domain | NOT_STARTED | IN_PROGRESS | FAILED | BLOCKED | PASSED | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FOUNDATION | 0 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 |
| MANAGER | 0 | 22 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 23 |
| IAM_GOV | 0 | 8 | 9 | 1 | 0 | 18 |
| AGENT_RUNTIME | 0 | 16 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 17 |
| LLM_FINOPS | 0 | 15 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 16 |
| DATA_RAG | 0 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 |
| MULTIMODAL | 0 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 12 |
| OBSERVABILITY | 0 | 12 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 14 |
| SECURITY_SOC | 0 | 22 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 25 |
| AUDIT_EVIDENCE | 0 | 15 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 17 |
| DEV_MARKETPLACE | 0 | 20 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 22 |
| FRONTEND | 0 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| LICENSING_RELEASE | 0 | 8 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 16 |
| DOCUMENTATION | 0 | 10 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 12 |
| RELEASE_ACCEPTANCE | 0 | 10 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 16 |
| HOST_BOOTSTRAP | 0 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 |
| CLUSTER_MANAGEMENT | 0 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 12 |
| HIGH_AVAILABILITY | 0 | 0 | 7 | 11 | 0 | 18 |
| BACKUP_RECOVERY | 0 | 0 | 15 | 4 | 0 | 19 |
| DISASTER_RECOVERY | 0 | 0 | 8 | 3 | 0 | 11 |
| INFRA_UI | 0 | 7 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| INFRA_SDK | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| Total | 0 | 253 | 57 | 45 | 0 | 355 |
Per requirement
| ID | Priority | Requirement (kit wording, French) | Status | What remains or what blocks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FOUN-001 | P0 | Inventaire repos branches et changements existants | IN_PROGRESS | traceability / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-TRACE / test_cited_files_exist and test_every_kit_requirement_is_traced_once_in_kit_order: inventory linked to code, gaps generated in STATUS and BLOCKERS. |
| FOUN-002 | P0 | Architecture en plans et ADR versionnés | IN_PROGRESS | architecture / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-TRACE / ADR-0101 to ADR-0125 and archify diagrams per plane; test_implementation_documents_exist_in_both_languages checks the FR and EN documents. |
| FOUN-003 | P0 | Matrice bidirectionnelle exigences code API SQL UI tests docs | IN_PROGRESS | traceability / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-TRACE / Each ID links code, API, SQL, UI, tests and docs; test_cited_evidence_exists_and_passed_rows_have_green_runs requires a green run per cited evidence. |
| FOUN-004 | P0 | Plan DAG et lots livrables | IN_PROGRESS | lot-plan / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-FL-LOTPLAN / New test_foundation_lot_plan: L0 to L10 DAG acyclic, valid order, FR table = EN = diagram (diagram had L1 to L3 and lacked L1 to L9: fixed and redelivered). |
| FOUN-005 | P0 | Monorepo conventions Python TS Go | IN_PROGRESS | monorepo / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-DEPLOY; sources changed since evidence E-CP-LINT; sources changed since evidence E-PORTAL; sources changed since evidence E-SDK-GO / Build and lint: Makefile (test_platform_makefile), Ruff (E-CP-LINT), TypeScript lint and typecheck (E-PORTAL), go vet (E-SDK-GO). |
| FOUN-006 | P0 | OpenAPI et JSON Schema versionnés | IN_PROGRESS | api-contracts / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-FOUNDATION; sources changed since evidence E-CONTRACTS / test_breaking_changes_detected and test_cli_refuses_breaking_regeneration; contracts/validate.py (29 schemas, 28 contracts) and contracts/tests. |
| FOUN-007 | P0 | PostgreSQL central accepté | IN_PROGRESS | postgresql / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-FOUNDATION / test_backup_restore_round_trip on a real PostgreSQL (pgserver): migrations applied, backup then restore compared. |
| FOUN-008 | P0 | Redis central accepté | IN_PROGRESS | redis / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-FOUNDATION / Real redis-server: cache, replication and failover (test_replication_and_failover), ACL, unsafe production config refused. |
| FOUN-009 | P0 | CI pipelines lint types unit integration e2e | IN_PROGRESS | ci / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-FL-RELEASE-CI / release/ci-runs/2026-10-30.json: real Gitea and act_runner run, every job succeeded; test_ci_run_evidence_schema_and_results checks it. |
| FOUN-010 | P0 | Gestion des secrets par références | IN_PROGRESS | secrets / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-FL-SECRETS / ExternalSecret references only, write-only secrets, scripts refusing a secret argument. Note: gitleaks reports 2 false positives (key_id) in contracts/examples, outside this lot. |
| FOUN-011 | P0 | SBOM et SPDX par artefact | IN_PROGRESS | sbom / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-COMPONENTS / SPDX JSON per artefact and up to date licence report (test_sbom_is_spdx_json_per_artefact, test_licence_reports_are_up_to_date). |
| FOUN-012 | P0 | Exceptions de licence PostgreSQL Redis client models | BLOCKED | Client approval of the licence exceptions [B-CLIENT] |
| FOUN-013 | P0 | Matrice versions composants et dependances | IN_PROGRESS | version-matrix / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-COMPONENTS / Pinned versions match the deploy files, dependency graph acyclic (test_dependency_graph_is_acyclic_and_resolvable). |
| FOUN-014 | P0 | Build de distribution signé et reproductible | FAILED | release-bundle / audit: existing / failed evidence E-FL-RELEASE / Two identical builds, cosign and sha256 verified offline, tampered artefact refused. |
| MANA-001 | P0 | Découverte clusters BYO ou managés | IN_PROGRESS | kubernetes-discovery / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-K8S / test_discovery_inventory proves the real inventory read from an envtest API server; test_register_guard_and_sealed_kubeconfig proves BYO registration with the context guard. |
| MANA-002 | P0 | Inventaire nodes CPU RAM stockage GPU | IN_PROGRESS | inventory / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-K8S; sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI / test_discovery_inventory checks node CPU, memory, storage and GPU as read; kubernetes.test.tsx checks they are displayed in the console. |
| MANA-003 | P0 | Preflight DNS TLS ports capacité versions | IN_PROGRESS | preflight / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / test_preflight_blocks_installation_on_critical_failures proves the install is refused when a critical check (DNS, TLS, ports, capacity, versions) fails. |
| MANA-004 | P0 | Profils development enterprise banking airgapped hybrid | IN_PROGRESS | profiles / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER; sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI / test_each_profile_is_installable_or_blocked_with_reason evaluates every profile (development, enterprise, banking, airgapped, hybrid): installable or blocked with the failing rule, shown by lifecycle.test.tsx. |
| MANA-005 | P0 | Catalogue managed components | IN_PROGRESS | catalog / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / test_catalog_loads_and_is_open_source_only validates every service manifest; test_every_template_renders renders every template. |
| MANA-006 | P0 | Graphe de dépendances et ordre des opérations | IN_PROGRESS | dependency-graph / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / test_catalog_problems_are_reported detects dependency cycles; test_engine_runs_stages_in_order_with_agent_and_server_tasks and test_provider_and_consumer_install_end_to_end prove provider then consumer order. |
| MANA-007 | P0 | Reconciler desired observed states | IN_PROGRESS | reconciler / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER; sources changed since evidence E-MG-K8S / test_install_converges_and_operates waits for the observed state to reach the desired state (envtest); test_change_outside_the_manager_is_detected_and_reconciled converges back an out-of-band change. |
| MANA-008 | P0 | Différencier health operation security states | IN_PROGRESS | states / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-K8S; sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI / test_states_stay_distinct (API) and kubernetes.test.tsx "four distinct states" (console) prove health, operation and security states stay separate. |
| MANA-009 | P0 | Install/config/start/stop/restart | IN_PROGRESS | service-operations / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / test_actions_rolling_restart_and_permissions runs start, stop and restart on real processes and checks the observed state; test_provider_and_consumer_install_end_to_end covers install. |
| MANA-010 | P0 | Rolling restart drain maintenance et PDB | IN_PROGRESS | rolling-restart / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER; sources changed since evidence E-MG-K8S / TestRollingRestartRespectsPDB and test_maintenance_protects_the_component prove a critical service stays protected by its PDB and by maintenance. |
| MANA-011 | P0 | Scale KEDA HPA quotas ressources | IN_PROGRESS | scaling / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-K8S / test_install_converges_and_operates scales out, scales in, then HPA; TestScaleReplicasAndAutoscalers covers HPA and KEDA ScaledObject (envtest). |
| MANA-012 | P0 | Upgrade migration compatibilité canary | IN_PROGRESS | upgrades / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / test_stateless_upgrade_with_canary_then_rollback upgrades from the previous version with a canary; test_upgrade_compatibility_refusals refuses incompatible jumps. |
| MANA-013 | P0 | Rollback ou restore explicite | IN_PROGRESS | rollback / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / test_stateful_upgrade_backup_migration_refused_rollback_and_restore proves a safe rollback or an explicit refusal after a migration, with restore. |
| MANA-014 | P0 | Health liveness readiness functional probes | IN_PROGRESS | probes / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER; sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI / test_liveness_readiness_and_smoke_are_distinct runs a functional smoke test distinct from the probes; lifecycle.test.tsx shows it apart. |
| MANA-015 | P0 | Drift detection configuration | IN_PROGRESS | drift / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / test_change_outside_the_manager_is_detected_and_reconciled changes a file outside the manager and checks it is detected. |
| MANA-016 | P0 | Config versions typed schema et secret refs | IN_PROGRESS | config-versions / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER; sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI / test_versions_diff_restore_and_secrets validates the typed schema, secret references and restore of a previous version. |
| MANA-017 | P0 | Node agent Go avec allowlist | IN_PROGRESS | node-agent / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-NM-AGENT-GO; sources changed since evidence E-NM-INFRA-HOSTS; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / G09 Go agent: test_agent_go_integration proves a command outside the allowlist is refused; test_agent_signature_is_required refuses an unsigned command. |
| MANA-018 | P0 | Platform Operator Kubernetes | IN_PROGRESS | operator / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-K8S / TestInstallConvergesFromWorkloadStatus reconciles the ManagedComponent CRD against envtest. |
| MANA-019 | P0 | Backups coordonnés et tests restore | IN_PROGRESS | service-backups / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / test_coordinated_backup_then_restore_executed_and_verified runs the coordinated backup then a real verified restore. |
| MANA-020 | P0 | Diagnostics support bundle expurgé | IN_PROGRESS | support-bundle / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / test_support_bundle_has_no_secret_and_no_personal_data opens the bundle and checks there is no secret and no personal data. |
| MANA-021 | P0 | Installation offline et images miroir | FAILED | offline-install / audit: existing / failed evidence E-NM-PACKAGING; failed evidence E-MG-AIRGAP / test_airgapped_install_in_empty_network_namespace verifies and runs the navin-manager mirror bundle inside unshare -rn (no network interface); test_mirror_manifest_resolver_and_api resolves images from the sha256-verified mirror. |
| MANA-022 | P0 | Bascule sur infrastructure client existante | IN_PROGRESS | byo / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER; sources changed since evidence E-MG-K8S / test_client_managed_destructive_refused and TestClientManagedIsObservedOnly prove no destructive command is sent to client infrastructure; test_connection_bindings_and_unmanaged_provider binds an existing provider. |
| MANA-023 | P0 | Rapport recette installation signé | IN_PROGRESS | acceptance-report / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / test_signed_acceptance_report_with_evidence produces a signed PASS, FAIL and BLOCKED report with evidence and checks the signature. |
| IAM_-001 | P0 | Keycloak OIDC SAML SSO MFA | FAILED | keycloak / audit: existing / failed evidence E-G03-IAM-REAL / Real Keycloak: PKCE login, refresh, logout (userinfo refused after logout), TOTP MFA required, SAML client and IdP descriptor. |
| IAM_-002 | P0 | Identités de service SPIFFE SPIRE mTLS | FAILED | spire / audit: existing / failed evidence E-G03-IAM-REAL / Real SPIRE: per-workload SVIDs, mTLS accepts the expected peer and refuses others, SPIFFE ID resolved to the service identity. |
| IAM_-003 | P0 | OpenFGA relations ressources | FAILED | openfga / audit: existing / failed evidence E-G03-IAM-REAL / Real OpenFGA: allow/deny per document and action, relation required on tool routes. |
| IAM_-004 | P0 | OPA Rego ABAC contextuel | FAILED | opa / audit: existing / failed evidence E-G03-IAM-REAL / Real OPA: allow/deny decisions and obligations enforced from a signed bundle; decision taken before each action with the original user. |
| IAM_-005 | P0 | Policy bundles version et publication | FAILED | policy-bundles / audit: existing / failed evidence E-G03-IAM-REAL / The bundle revision actually loaded by OPA is read and enforced; a bundle signed with another key is refused. |
| IAM_-006 | P0 | Deny by default et fail-closed | FAILED | fail-closed / audit: existing / failed evidence E-G03-IAM-REAL / OPA killed, then OpenFGA down: the sensitive tool call is refused and audited; audit store unavailable blocks mutations. |
| IAM_-007 | P0 | Context Authority signe contextes | IN_PROGRESS | context-authority / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTEXT / Signed context (JCS RFC 8785) verified; tampered signature, wrong audience, issuer, expiry and foreign tenant refused. |
| IAM_-008 | P0 | Delegation scopes audience expiry depth | IN_PROGRESS | delegation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTEXT / Restricted delegation always narrower (scopes, audience, expiry, depth), cascading revocation, subagent never wider. |
| IAM_-009 | P0 | Identité on_behalf_of utilisateur de bout en bout | IN_PROGRESS | on-behalf-of / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTEXT / Every audit event of a run and its subagents carries the original user (on_behalf_of), the SPIFFE workload and the delegation chain. |
| IAM_-010 | P0 | Sessions révoquées en cours de run | IN_PROGRESS | revocation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTEXT / Delegation, user or session revocation mid-run: the next sensitive action is refused. |
| IAM_-011 | P0 | Identités pour agents planifiés | IN_PROGRESS | mandates / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTEXT / A scheduled run needs an approved mandate bound to a service identity, with no user impersonation. |
| IAM_-012 | P0 | Séparation roles admins developers auditors | FAILED | roles / audit: existing / failed evidence E-G03-IAM-REAL / Role/route matrix run against the backend: admin, developer and auditor separated. |
| IAM_-013 | P0 | Break glass exceptionnel | IN_PROGRESS | break-glass / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTEXT / Break glass: two distinct approvers, time bound, audited. |
| IAM_-014 | P0 | Approval four-eyes et séparation tâches | FAILED | four-eyes / audit: existing / failed evidence E-G03-IAM-REAL / The requester (or the user an agent acts for) cannot approve; promotion waits for another approver. |
| IAM_-015 | P0 | Permissions données RLS et droits sources | IN_PROGRESS | data-permissions / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-DATA / Chunks and documents outside ACL or from another tenant refused, source permission checked before ingestion, forced RLS on every tenant table. |
| IAM_-016 | P0 | Policy simulator et audit des changements | FAILED | policy-simulator / audit: existing / failed evidence E-G03-IAM-REAL / Revisions, diff and simulation tested in the backend; security/policy-simulator screen tested (roles, i18n). |
| IAM_-017 | P0 | Modeles de rôles RBAC ABAC ReBAC | IN_PROGRESS | effective-rights / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTEXT / Effective permission = intersection of RBAC/ABAC/ReBAC and delegation: the pattern algebra never widens. |
| IAM_-018 | P0 | KMS HSM integration via client | BLOCKED | client HSM or KMS (slot, PIN, key labels) [B-CLIENT] |
| AGEN-001 | P0 | Runtime Navin Loop Runner SubagentManager | IN_PROGRESS | navin-runtime / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-SDK-RUNTIME; sources changed since evidence E-AL-AGENTS / AgentLoop (loop/init.py), RunPlan (loop/plan.py), AgentRunner (runtime/runner.py), SubagentManager (subagents) and MessageBus (runtime/bus.py): test_plan_act_verify_completes and test_runner_loops_model_tools_model run a multi-step agent to a verified result. |
| AGEN-002 | P0 | Planning acting verification recovery | IN_PROGRESS | navin-runtime / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-SDK-RUNTIME; sources changed since evidence E-AL-AGENTS / Planning, acting, verification and recovery: test_recover_then_fail_after_max_recoveries and test_verifier_and_final_verifier_recover inject errors and check the correction then the bounded stop; continuation rules are proven by test_navin_runtime. |
| AGEN-003 | P0 | Checkpoints et reprise sans re-exécution non sûre | IN_PROGRESS | checkpoints / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-SDK-RUNTIME; sources changed since evidence E-AL-AGENTS / test_crash_resume_from_last_checkpoint resumes after a crash from the last checkpoint without replaying tools already run; test_checkpoint_and_resume proves the idempotent server side resume. |
| AGEN-004 | P0 | Heartbeat deadline cancellation | IN_PROGRESS | heartbeat / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-AGENTS; sources changed since evidence E-AL-SDK-RUNTIME / Suspension, cancellation and kill through the heartbeat (test_heartbeat_continue_then_stop_on_suspend_kill_cancel) and timeout of a run without heartbeat (test_heartbeat_job_flags_then_times_out). |
| AGEN-005 | P0 | Temporal workflows durables | IN_PROGRESS | temporal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-DURABLE / Real local Temporal server: test_durable_workflow_resumes_after_worker_kill kills the worker process mid workflow and checks it resumes. |
| AGEN-006 | P0 | NATS JetStream events durables | IN_PROGRESS | nats / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-DURABLE / Real nats-server JetStream: test_dedup_ordering_redelivery_exactly_once proves redelivery and deduplication. |
| AGEN-007 | P0 | gVisor sandbox code outil | IN_PROGRESS | gvisor / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-GVISOR / Real runsc: host write and network are blocked, and untrusted code is refused without sandbox. E-AL-GVISOR must run outside the exec tool sandbox (green that way, fails inside). |
| AGEN-008 | P0 | Agent registry versions owners risk states | IN_PROGRESS | agent-registry / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-AGENTS / Immutable versions, owner and risk level (test_agent_manifest_apply_and_immutable_versions), approval and promotion (test_approvals_promotion), suspension (test_kill_switch_blocks_new_runs). |
| AGEN-009 | P0 | Application registry avec deploy et statuts | IN_PROGRESS | applications / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-GATEWAYS / test_application_lifecycle_and_external_agent: application registered, deployed, governed and visible statuses. |
| AGEN-010 | P0 | Agents tiers via SDK et gateways | IN_PROGRESS | third-party-agents / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-GATEWAYS / An external agent goes through the model and MCP gateways and its unauthorised calls are refused (test_external_agent_model_and_mcp_gateways, test_guard_direct, test_gateway_pep_untrusted). |
| AGEN-011 | P0 | MCP gateway authz par invocation | IN_PROGRESS | mcp-gateway / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-GATEWAYS / Authorisation on every MCP invocation: test_pep_mcp_denied blocks the unauthorised call, test_mcp_gateway checks the allowed path. |
| AGEN-012 | P0 | MCP catalogue discovery outils schemas | IN_PROGRESS | mcp-catalog / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-GATEWAYS / Real MCP server discovery: tools, schemas, versions and scopes exposed after approval. |
| AGEN-013 | P0 | API gateway APISIX auth rate limit | BLOCKED | real APISIX start and ingress and egress policy test under traffic: Docker absent [B-DOCKER] |
| AGEN-014 | P0 | Sécurisation sous-agent identités et ressources | IN_PROGRESS | subagents / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-AGENTS; sources changed since evidence E-AL-SDK-RUNTIME / The subagent never gets wider rights and the audit carries the user, the delegation and causal ids; depth, count and inherited budget are bounded. |
| AGEN-015 | P0 | Validation args outils effets side-effects | IN_PROGRESS | tool-validation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-GATEWAYS / Arguments and effects validated before mutation: scope refused, approval required for side effects, untrusted result marked. |
| AGEN-016 | P0 | Webhook events signés et idempotents | IN_PROGRESS | webhooks / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-GATEWAYS / test_webhook_signature_replay_and_dedupe proves invalid signature refusal, replay refusal and deduplication. |
| AGEN-017 | P0 | Protected execution des skills/plugins | IN_PROGRESS | protected-execution / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-GATEWAYS / test_install_refuses_unapproved_or_unrequested_permissions: a requested permission is never granted implicitly; tampered or unsigned skills are refused. |
| LLM_-001 | P1 | LiteLLM OSS proxy central | IN_PROGRESS | litellm / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-LLM / Real LiteLLM OSS proxy (1.106.5, venv of tools/litellm/setup.sh) in front of a local upstream: call through the platform gateway, usage and audit checked. LiteLLM is the unified gateway, vLLM the inference engine (LLM_-003). |
| LLM_-002 | P1 | Provider local cloud config et secrets | IN_PROGRESS | providers / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-LLM / Write-only credentials, absent from the generated LiteLLM config; route tested by simulation. |
| LLM_-003 | P1 | vLLM inference locale | BLOCKED | real vLLM inference of an acceptance model: no GPU on this host [B-GPU] |
| LLM_-004 | P1 | Registry modeles versions licenses weights | IN_PROGRESS | model-registry / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-LLM / A version needs licence and weights provenance, and its publication an approval. |
| LLM_-005 | P1 | Model modalities texte vision image audio video | IN_PROGRESS | modalities / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-LLM / The published matrix is generated and a capability without an adapter test is never marked verified. |
| LLM_-006 | P1 | Reasoning effort context output params | IN_PROGRESS | reasoning-effort / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-LLM; sources changed since evidence E-AL-SDK-RUNTIME / Unsupported effort refused with 422 effort_not_supported (resolver.py:65), never silently converted; the real provider value is kept. |
| LLM_-007 | P1 | Fallback restrict par sensibilité région | IN_PROGRESS | fallback / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-LLM / No fallback to a forbidden region, a lower classification, a blocked provider or another jurisdiction. |
| LLM_-008 | P1 | Budget per user agent tenant project | IN_PROGRESS | budgets / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-FINOPS; sources changed since evidence E-AL-LLM / test_finops_quotas and test_integration_llm_finops: blocking on the configured cap per user, agent, tenant and project. |
| LLM_-009 | P1 | Quota rpm tpm concurrence | IN_PROGRESS | quotas / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-FINOPS / tools/perf/loadgen starts a real Control Plane and drives it concurrently; test_quotas_answer_429_with_documented_codes_and_recover proves the rpm, tpm and concurrency 429 then the recovery. Short mode on a shared host: no absolute latency is claimed. |
| LLM_-010 | P1 | Pricing dated input output cache reasoning | IN_PROGRESS | pricing / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-FINOPS / Dated and versioned pricing (input, output, cache, reasoning) and aggregated usage; no price is shipped. |
| LLM_-011 | P1 | FinOps audio image vidéo GPU stockage | IN_PROGRESS | finops-media / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-FINOPS / Audio, image, video, GPU and storage costs with provenance, or unavailable without a price. |
| LLM_-012 | P1 | Cost reservation reconciliation | IN_PROGRESS | reservation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-FINOPS / Estimated reservation before the call then reconciliation with the real receipt. |
| LLM_-013 | P1 | A/B model evaluations et baselines | IN_PROGRESS | ab-evaluation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-LLM / A/B model comparison against a baseline, saved and read back. |
| LLM_-014 | P1 | Choix providers GCP Azure AWS Anthropic OpenAI etc | IN_PROGRESS | provider-presets / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-LLM / GCP, Azure, AWS, Anthropic, OpenAI and other presets with their fields; adapters checked against local upstreams. No cloud credentials are supplied here: an online check is only due when credentials exist (conditional criterion). |
| LLM_-015 | P1 | Local-only / airgapped models | IN_PROGRESS | isolation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-LLM / Isolated mode: the gateway refuses every external host for a local-only model (no egress). |
| LLM_-016 | P1 | Model rollout et rollback | IN_PROGRESS | rollout / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-AL-LLM / Approved publication, canary then rollback with kept history. |
| DATA-001 | P0 | Storage abstraction S3 AWS | IN_PROGRESS | storage-s3 / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-STORAGE / Upload, download, metadata, integrity and refusal of a wrong secret proven on a real S3 server (SeaweedFS); SigV4 signing is checked against the official AWS vectors and the AWS profile (virtual-hosted URLs). No real AWS account is contacted here. |
| DATA-002 | P0 | Storage abstraction Azure Blob | IN_PROGRESS | storage-azure / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-STORAGE / Azure Blob adapter tests on the real Azurite emulator (shared key, SAS, Entra): the 'adapter tests' criterion is met. Validation on a real Azure account not done [B-CLOUD]. |
| DATA-003 | P0 | Storage abstraction GCS | IN_PROGRESS | storage-gcs / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-STORAGE / GCS adapter tests on a real fake-gcs-server: the 'adapter tests' criterion is met. Validation on a real GCP project not done [B-CLOUD]. |
| DATA-004 | P0 | Storage abstraction IBM COS | IN_PROGRESS | storage-ibm / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-STORAGE / IBM COS adapter tests: IAM API key exchanged for a bearer token (faithful mock, no IBM IAM emulator exists) and HMAC path on real SeaweedFS. 'Adapter tests' criterion met; validation on a real IBM Cloud account not done [B-CLOUD]. |
| DATA-005 | P0 | Storage abstraction Seaweed S3 | IN_PROGRESS | storage-seaweedfs / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-STORAGE / Adapter tested against the official SeaweedFS binary (pinned by tools/emulators/fetch.sh): CRUD, multipart, integrity. |
| DATA-006 | P0 | Capabilities discovery versioning retention WORM | IN_PROGRESS | storage-capabilities / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-STORAGE / Discovery really probes versioning, object lock, legal hold and SSE on SeaweedFS, Azurite and fake-gcs; a missing, unknown, unverified or stale capability is refused (WORM export refused without verified object lock). |
| DATA-007 | P0 | Presigned URLs et contrôles accès | IN_PROGRESS | presigned-urls / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-STORAGE / Presigned URLs refused by the real server after expiry and outside method or key, on S3, Azure (SAS) and GCS; policy decides before the action. |
| DATA-008 | P0 | Qdrant filtre tenant et ACL | IN_PROGRESS | qdrant / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT / Real Qdrant: two tenants, no cross-tenant leak through tenant and ACL filters. |
| DATA-009 | P0 | Haystack ingest retrieve rerank | IN_PROGRESS | haystack / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT; sources changed since evidence E-DM-DATA-MEDIA / Ingestion through the real Haystack 2 components (DocumentCleaner, DocumentSplitter), hybrid retrieval then rerank through the Model Gateway (ordered result, rerank_score, reported fallback) and provenance (document, version, source, position). Retrieval and rerank run in the platform pipeline described in Haystack format, not in a Haystack Retriever. |
| DATA-010 | P0 | Docling extraction PDF/Word/table | IN_PROGRESS | docling / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT / Real Docling parses the acceptance PDF and the Word table cells, end-to-end ingestion through the API. |
| DATA-011 | P0 | PaddleOCR scan images | IN_PROGRESS | paddleocr / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT / Real PaddleOCR reads the text of a rendered acceptance image; errors are reported. |
| DATA-012 | P0 | OpenLineage provenance transformations | IN_PROGRESS | openlineage / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT; sources changed since evidence E-DM-DATA-MEDIA / OpenLineage events linking source, document and answer; walk from answer to source and back. |
| DATA-013 | P0 | Chunk-level ACL et document-level ACL | IN_PROGRESS | acl / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT / Fragments forbidden by chunk or document ACL are absent from the context. |
| DATA-014 | P0 | Source permission pre-retrieval | IN_PROGRESS | source-permissions / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT / Source permission is checked before ingestion and retrieval. |
| DATA-015 | P0 | RAG poisoning detection quarantine | IN_PROGRESS | poisoning / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT / Suspicious document (injection or outlier embedding) isolated in quarantine, released by a steward. |
| DATA-016 | P0 | Retention/erasure data lifecycle | IN_PROGRESS | retention / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DM-DATA-MEDIA / Retention rule applied with effect measured in the database (archived encrypted, purged, legal hold respected) and subject erasure. |
| DATA-017 | P0 | RAG citations et version source | IN_PROGRESS | citations / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT / The answer cites only authorised sources with their version. |
| DATA-018 | P0 | PII detection Presidio | IN_PROGRESS | presidio / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT / Real Presidio detects banking entities (IBAN, card, etc.). |
| DATA-019 | P0 | Masking before LLM logs outputs | IN_PROGRESS | masking / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT; sources changed since evidence E-DM-DATA-MEDIA / No raw PII in the LLM request, the output, the logs and the traces of the test. |
| DATA-020 | P0 | Tokenization reversible vault separé | IN_PROGRESS | tokenization / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT; sources changed since evidence E-DM-DATA-MEDIA / Detokenization subject to rights and audited, separate vault. |
| DATA-021 | P0 | Tink encryption envelope et rotation clés | IN_PROGRESS | tink / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT / Tink envelope encryption: opaque ciphertext, other tenant refused, rotation and rewrap tested. |
| DATA-022 | P0 | Residency et data egress restrictions | IN_PROGRESS | residency / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT / Forbidden region and destination blocked (region_not_allowed, no upstream request). |
| DATA-023 | P0 | SQL RLS isolation end-to-end | IN_PROGRESS | rls / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT; sources changed since evidence E-DM-DATA-MEDIA / SQL RLS: under the application role, tenant A reads no row of tenant B. |
| DATA-024 | P0 | Cache sensible encrypted et segregation | IN_PROGRESS | sensitive-cache / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-RAG-KIT / Sensitive cache encrypted and tenant segregated on real Redis. |
| MULT-001 | P1 | LiveKit room et streaming temps réel | BLOCKED | voice session with real WebRTC media (UDP, ICE, codecs) needs a WebRTC client [B-WEBRTC] |
| MULT-002 | P1 | WebRTC reconnect low-latency | BLOCKED | end-to-end WebRTC reconnect and latency: no WebRTC client [B-WEBRTC] |
| MULT-003 | P1 | faster whisper STT | IN_PROGRESS | faster-whisper / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-VOICE / Real faster-whisper transcribes the test audio synthesised by Kokoro, through the platform adapters. |
| MULT-004 | P1 | pyannote diarisation | BLOCKED | pyannote/speaker-diarization-3.1 weights gated on Hugging Face [B-GATED] |
| MULT-005 | P1 | Silero VAD | IN_PROGRESS | silero-vad / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-VOICE / Real Silero VAD detects the speech segments of the test audio. |
| MULT-006 | P1 | Kokoro TTS | IN_PROGRESS | kokoro / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-VOICE / Real Kokoro (kokoro-onnx, sha256 pinned weights) synthesises the audio, then transcribed by faster-whisper. Client approval of the weights belongs to MULT-011. |
| MULT-007 | P1 | VLM image/doc et vidéo frames | BLOCKED | real vision model inference (GPU and qualified weights) [B-GPU] |
| MULT-008 | P1 | Audio recording consent retention | IN_PROGRESS | consent / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-VOICE / Transcription refused without consent then allowed and audited; recording purged by retention. |
| MULT-009 | P1 | Transcription PII protection | IN_PROGRESS | transcript-pii / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-VOICE / Transcript filtered in storage, logs and spans. |
| MULT-010 | P1 | Interrupt/turn cancellation | IN_PROGRESS | barge-in / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-VOICE / Barge-in: the response turn is cancelled and the next turn is clean. |
| MULT-011 | P1 | Licences codecs drivers models weights | BLOCKED | model qualification: client approval of the exceptions (approval_status pending) [B-CLIENT] |
| MULT-012 | P1 | Identity user livekit participant actor | IN_PROGRESS | participant-identity / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-VOICE / Audit per participant and agent (user, LiveKit participant, agent acting on behalf of the user). |
| OBSE-001 | P0 | OpenTelemetry instrumentation W3C trace | IN_PROGRESS | otel-trace / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-OBS / An incoming W3C traceparent crosses API, gateway, upstream and worker through the real otelcol-contrib: same trace_id, linked parent spans. |
| OBSE-002 | P0 | OTel collector filtering export | IN_PROGRESS | otel-collector / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-OBS / The pinned collector removes e-mails, tokens and secrets from spans and logs before export (assertions on the exported file). |
| OBSE-003 | P0 | Opik traces prompt evaluations | IN_PROGRESS | opik / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-OBS / LLM and tool spans (llm.call) are sent to Opik as OTLP without personal data; the collector Opik pipeline keeps the GenAI spans only. |
| OBSE-004 | P0 | Jaeger distributed traces | IN_PROGRESS | jaeger / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-OBS / An OTLP span sent to the real collector is queryable in a real Jaeger v2. |
| OBSE-005 | P0 | Prometheus metrics p50 p95 p99 | IN_PROGRESS | latency-percentiles / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-OBS / p50/p95/p99 rules tested by promtool test rules and restricted to metrics really exposed; dashboards are in the Navin Manager and the portal (ADR-0169). |
| OBSE-006 | P0 | Perses dashboards unified | FAILED | dashboards / audit: existing / failed evidence E-NM-SERVER / No dashboard server any more (ADR-0169); dashboards of the machines and services in the Navin Manager with their history in the database, portal screens for agents, LLM gateway, FinOps, SLO and security; no deployable file declares the removed dashboard server any more. |
| OBSE-007 | P0 | Alertmanager routing silences grouping | IN_PROGRESS | alertmanager / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-OBS / The shipped config, run by the real Alertmanager 0.34.2, delivers a test alert to the webhook (/v1/incidents/alerts, Bearer, oncall receiver, alertname+tenant grouping); amtool checks routing and inhibition. |
| OBSE-008 | P0 | OpenSearch logs indexing search | IN_PROGRESS | opensearch-logs / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-OBS / On a real OpenSearch 3.9.0: templates, ISM, search and tenant filtering. |
| OBSE-009 | P0 | OpenSearch security analytics detections | IN_PROGRESS | security-analytics / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-OBS / Security Analytics rules raise findings on the platform security events (real OpenSearch). |
| OBSE-010 | P0 | OpenLineage lineage exploration | IN_PROGRESS | lineage-exploration / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-FINOPS-PERF / Walk from answer to source and back in the lineage graph. |
| OBSE-011 | P0 | Opik et OTel pas seul audit probant | IN_PROGRESS | flow-separation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-OBS; sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC / Opik down: PostgreSQL copy and audit event kept; an alerting plane outage does not weaken enforcement. |
| OBSE-012 | P0 | SLO et error budget tracking | IN_PROGRESS | slo / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-OBS / SLO and error budget computed per service on recorded requests, audited /v1/telemetry/slo route, burn-rate rules tested by promtool. |
| OBSE-013 | P0 | FinOps metrics tenant model agent | IN_PROGRESS | finops-metrics / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-FINOPS-PERF / Test costs attributed per tenant, model and agent without cross-tenant leakage. |
| OBSE-014 | P0 | Performance CPU GPU RAM concurrency | BLOCKED | GPU measurements impossible: no GPU on this host [B-GPU] |
| SECU-001 | P0 | Falco runtime detection | BLOCKED | Real Falco alert on a node (eBPF) not observable without a cluster [B-CLUSTER] |
| SECU-002 | P0 | Tetragon runtime enforcement | BLOCKED | Tetragon enforcement effect measurable only on a cluster kernel [B-CLUSTER] |
| SECU-003 | P0 | Detection ingestor normalize events | IN_PROGRESS | detection-ingestor / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Falco, Tetragon, OpenSearch events normalized through signed webhooks then correlated. |
| SECU-004 | P0 | Event correlator user agent tenant | IN_PROGRESS | event-correlator / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Multi-source detections linked into one incident by user, agent and tenant. |
| SECU-005 | P0 | AI risk engine policy decision | IN_PROGRESS | risk-engine / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Severity and reason traced; Rego and in-process decisions agree. |
| SECU-006 | P0 | Detection prompt injection | IN_PROGRESS | detect-prompt-injection / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Forbidden tool call refused despite the injection. |
| SECU-007 | P0 | Detection data exfiltration | IN_PROGRESS | detect-exfiltration / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Egress blocked and incident opened. |
| SECU-008 | P0 | Detection secrets leak | IN_PROGRESS | detect-secret-leak / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Fake secret blocked before export. |
| SECU-009 | P0 | Detection runaway agent cost loops | IN_PROGRESS | detect-runaway / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / The circuit breaker trips on the runaway agent. |
| SECU-010 | P0 | Detection MCP compromised plugin | IN_PROGRESS | detect-mcp-plugin / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Unsigned plugin refused, compromised MCP disabled. |
| SECU-011 | P0 | Detection privilege escalation | IN_PROGRESS | detect-privilege-escalation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Escalation refused, detected, identity suspended. |
| SECU-012 | P0 | Detection RAG poisoning | IN_PROGRESS | detect-rag-poisoning / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Suspect document isolated (knowledge base quarantined). |
| SECU-013 | P0 | Detection no-audit or unauthorized policy change | IN_PROGRESS | detect-policy-change / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Unaudited or unauthorized policy change: incident generated. |
| SECU-014 | P0 | SOC incidents assign lifecycle | IN_PROGRESS | soc-incidents / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Assignment, statuses and auditable timeline. |
| SECU-015 | P0 | SOAR playbooks approved typed actions | IN_PROGRESS | soar-typed-actions / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Typed catalogue reactions only, never a free shell command. |
| SECU-016 | P0 | Kill Switch run agent subagents | IN_PROGRESS | kill-switch-run / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Run and subagents cancelled, new actions refused. |
| SECU-017 | P0 | Kill Switch application tool MCP provider | IN_PROGRESS | kill-switch-app / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Tool/MCP/provider block persists across restart. |
| SECU-018 | P0 | Kill Switch network Cilium | BLOCKED | Real CiliumNetworkPolicy isolation not verifiable without a cluster [B-CLUSTER] |
| SECU-019 | P0 | Kill Switch credentials user and tenant | IN_PROGRESS | kill-switch-credentials / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Credentials, user and tenant revocation enforced by authentication. |
| SECU-020 | P0 | Containment desired observed receipts | IN_PROGRESS | containment-receipts / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / VERIFIED only on real proof; drift reapplied. |
| SECU-021 | P0 | Separation alerting vs enforcement vs audit | IN_PROGRESS | plane-separation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Alerting or policy engine outage: enforcement stays closed. |
| SECU-022 | P0 | Recover workflow four-eyes and reauthorization | IN_PROGRESS | recovery-four-eyes / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Four-eyes recovery then reauthorization. |
| SECU-023 | P0 | Transaction safety in incident | IN_PROGRESS | transaction-safety / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Retried payment never executes twice, even when killed in flight. |
| SECU-024 | P0 | False positive proportionality guard | IN_PROGRESS | proportionality-guard / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / Predefined automation criteria (Rego data = engine config), proportionality guard. |
| SECU-025 | P0 | SOC consoles and access control | IN_PROGRESS | soc-access / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G06-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-G06-OPA / SOC roles, access audit, sealed chain of custody, tenant isolation. |
| AUDI-001 | P0 | Immutable audit event schema | IN_PROGRESS | audit-schema / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-AUDIT; sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTRACTS; sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTEXT / audit-event v1 schema validated; emitted events conform; the app role cannot rewrite. |
| AUDI-002 | P0 | Audit capture who what when how why result | IN_PROGRESS | audit-schema / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTEXT; sources changed since evidence E-G03-AUDIT / Every mutation is audited with actor, action, resource, time, reason and result. |
| AUDI-003 | P0 | Trace and run ID correlation | IN_PROGRESS | audit-schema / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTEXT / Parent run and subagent: run_id, execution_id, action_id and parent_event_id rebuild the multi-agent timeline. |
| AUDI-004 | P0 | Audit policy FGA OPA decisions | FAILED | evidence / audit: existing / failed evidence E-G03-IAM-REAL / OPA/FGA decisions audited with id, version, reason and obligations. |
| AUDI-005 | P0 | Audit approvals delegation rights lineage | IN_PROGRESS | audit-schema / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-CONTEXT / Delegation chain and approvals correlated in audit events. |
| AUDI-006 | P0 | Audit data classification DLP and egress | IN_PROGRESS | evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-EVIDENCE / DLP masking and egress decisions chained on the action. |
| AUDI-007 | P0 | Audit tool model prompt skill plugin versions | IN_PROGRESS | evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-EVIDENCE / Tool/model/prompt/skill/plugin versions of a run reconstructed. |
| AUDI-008 | P0 | Audit gateway durable queue no sampling | IN_PROGRESS | evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-EVIDENCE / Gateway: target outage then redelivery with no loss or duplicate, real JetStream with dedup. |
| AUDI-009 | P0 | Transactional outbox idempotency dedup | IN_PROGRESS | evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-EVIDENCE / Transactional outbox: rollback leaves no event, commit always has one, sequence gap detected. |
| AUDI-010 | P0 | Sealing canonicalization hashing signature | IN_PROGRESS | evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-EVIDENCE / Canonicalized, hashed, signed seal: verified online and offline, forged seal rejected. |
| AUDI-011 | P0 | Client storage WORM Object Lock capability | BLOCKED | real Azure and GCS immutability [B-CLOUD] |
| AUDI-012 | P0 | Audit encryption access separation | IN_PROGRESS | evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-EVIDENCE / Encrypted payload: the technical admin cannot see it, only the auditor decrypts with an audited reason. |
| AUDI-013 | P0 | Retention and legal hold workflows | IN_PROGRESS | evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-EVIDENCE / Legal hold blocks purge, release needs two distinct approvers, window respected. |
| AUDI-014 | P0 | Audit read/export accesses themselves audited | IN_PROGRESS | evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-EVIDENCE / Audit reads, searches and exports are audited themselves. |
| AUDI-015 | P0 | Evidence verification integrity monitoring | IN_PROGRESS | evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-EVIDENCE; sources changed since evidence E-G03-AUDIT / SQL tampering of a sealed event detected by the integrity monitor. |
| AUDI-016 | P0 | Clock sync event_time ingested sealed | IN_PROGRESS | evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-EVIDENCE / event_time, ingested_at and sealed_at distinct and ordered. |
| AUDI-017 | P0 | Incident evidence preservation and chain | IN_PROGRESS | incident-evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-G03-SOC / Append-only chained incident evidence, chain of custody (seal, access) verified, tampering detected. |
| DEV_-001 | P1 | SDK Python TypeScript Go | FAILED | sdks / audit: existing / failed evidence E-SDK-JAVA / API conformance proven by sdks/python/tests/test_api_conformance.py (412 Python tests), TS vitest 19, go test, mvn verify green. |
| DEV_-002 | P1 | SDK contracts shared JSON Schema | IN_PROGRESS | contracts / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CONTRACTS / contracts/validate.py: 29 schemas, 0 problem; contracts/tests 83 green. |
| DEV_-003 | P1 | CLI login and scaffold agent | IN_PROGRESS | cli / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY; sources changed since evidence E-DF-DAY-ONE / Project created, validated and its pytest suite run; day-one journey against a real Control Plane. |
| DEV_-004 | P1 | CLI create plugin skill prompt mcp connector | IN_PROGRESS | cli / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / create agent/mcp/connector/policy-pack/skill/prompt: each artefact validated against contracts/v1. |
| DEV_-005 | P1 | CLI validate test security authz | IN_PROGRESS | cli / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / test authz really runs opa test (PASS/FAIL observed); test security sets the exit code from the threshold. |
| DEV_-006 | P1 | CLI publish sign deploy doctor runs | IN_PROGRESS | cli / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / doctor, run, OCI sign/publish with cosign and gated deploy proven. |
| DEV_-007 | P1 | Developer code-first studio Monaco | IN_PROGRESS | monaco-studio / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-PORTAL / studio.test.ts: contracts/v1 schemas registered in the editor, save as new version; security.test.ts: Monaco bundled, no CDN. |
| DEV_-008 | P1 | Prompt registry drafts versions evaluations | IN_PROGRESS | prompt-registry / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-DATA / Prompt versions and audit by test_data_retention_lineage_prompts.py. |
| DEV_-009 | P1 | Skill registry SKILL.md and signatures | IN_PROGRESS | skill-registry / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-CAPS; sources changed since evidence E-DF-MARKETPLACE / SKILL.md digest and permissions checked. |
| DEV_-010 | P1 | MCP Studio server tool schemas auth | IN_PROGRESS | mcp-studio / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY; sources changed since evidence E-PORTAL / mcp-server template generated and its server tests run; studio/mcp screen API-conformant. |
| DEV_-011 | P1 | Connector Studio OAuth API key SQL | IN_PROGRESS | connector-studio / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY; sources changed since evidence E-PORTAL / mappers.test.ts splits secrets from config and never prefills secrets. |
| DEV_-012 | P1 | Rule and Policy Studio simulate publish | FAILED | policy-studio / audit: existing / failed evidence E-CP-IAM-REAL / Simulation and revision diff (studio.test.ts), server Rego simulator. |
| DEV_-013 | P1 | OCI artifact plugin packaging | IN_PROGRESS | marketplace / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-MARKETPLACE; sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / Proven by the cited test: test_build_is_reproducible_and_sbom_covers_every_file. |
| DEV_-014 | P1 | Manifest compatibility scopes dependencies | IN_PROGRESS | marketplace / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-MARKETPLACE; sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / Proven by the cited test: test_install_refuses_unapproved_or_unrequested_permissions. |
| DEV_-015 | P1 | Marketplace per tenant environment | IN_PROGRESS | marketplace / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-MARKETPLACE; sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / Proven by the cited test: test_other_tenant_reaches_no_marketplace_resource. |
| DEV_-016 | P1 | Plugin install upgrade rollback uninstall | IN_PROGRESS | marketplace / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-MARKETPLACE; sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / Proven by the cited test: test_upgrade_rollback_and_uninstall. |
| DEV_-017 | P1 | Packs RH end-to-end with fake data | IN_PROGRESS | marketplace / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-MARKETPLACE; sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / Proven by the cited test: test_hr_pack_end_to_end_with_granted_permissions_only. |
| DEV_-018 | P1 | Packs Finance end-to-end with fake data | IN_PROGRESS | marketplace / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-MARKETPLACE; sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / Proven by the cited test: test_finance_pack_end_to_end_payments_exactly_once. |
| DEV_-019 | P1 | Banking risk legal IT security sales etc templates | IN_PROGRESS | marketplace / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-MARKETPLACE; sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / Proven by the cited test: test_business_template_builds_and_its_suites_pass. |
| DEV_-020 | P1 | Plugin docs tests evaluation dashboards alerts | IN_PROGRESS | marketplace / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-MARKETPLACE; sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / Proven by the cited tests: test_alerts_are_checked_by_promtool and test_a_pack_with_dashboards_is_refused (packs no longer ship dashboards, ADR-0169). |
| DEV_-021 | P1 | Dev rules AGENTS.md security and quality | IN_PROGRESS | dev-rules / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / Every template ships AGENTS.md and RULES.md with checked rules and real controls (opa test, pytest). |
| DEV_-022 | P1 | Approval and production publication gates | IN_PROGRESS | marketplace / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-MARKETPLACE; sources changed since evidence E-DF-SDK-PY / Proven by the cited test: test_publication_fails_when_a_gate_input_is_missing. |
| FRON-001 | P1 | Unified Next.js React TypeScript portal | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: partial / Browser E2E and responsive not run: browser checks are off for this request; only vitest, tsc and lint prove. / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL; sources changed since evidence E-PORTAL-BUILD / 137 vitest tests, tsc and lint green. |
| FRON-002 | P1 | SSO navigation role and tenant | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / Menu filtered by role from GET /v1/me (filterNav), one test per role family; the server stays authoritative. |
| FRON-003 | P1 | Overview real health incidents costs | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / Overview figures computed by portal/src/lib/overview.ts from documented routes; a missing value shows "None", no default USD currency nor invented zero. |
| FRON-004 | P1 | Platform service lifecycle page | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL; sources changed since evidence E-PO-BRIDGE / Service lifecycle through the Platform Manager bridge (operations, modes); bridge tested against a real Manager. |
| FRON-005 | P1 | Cluster nodes and GPU explorer | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL; sources changed since evidence E-C11-LIVE / Machines and GPUs screen of the Manager console (hosts) from the reconciled agent inventory; the portal has no Platform Manager space any more (ADR-0162). |
| FRON-006 | P1 | Config version diff schema forms | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL; sources changed since evidence E-C11-LIVE / Platform configuration diff (platform-manager/config-diff), secrets never shown. |
| FRON-007 | P1 | IAM users groups service identities | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / Backend interactions conformant. |
| FRON-008 | P1 | Agents apps runs subagent explorer | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / Run detail shows steps and subagents (ExecutionTimeline, GET /v1/runs/{id}/subagents) and updates by SSE. |
| FRON-009 | P1 | Model providers gateway catalog and FinOps | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / Models, routes and FinOps role restricted on screen, lists compared with the server tuples. |
| FRON-010 | P1 | Developer studio prompts skills MCP plugins | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / Edit, test and publish covered by studio.test.ts. |
| FRON-011 | P1 | Marketplace catalog and install wizards | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / Catalogue, install and uninstall role gated and confirmed; signed install proven server side. |
| FRON-012 | P1 | Data RAG ACL ingest lineage UI | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / Documents show version, source_connector, readers (per document ACL) and status from the documented view. |
| FRON-013 | P1 | Policy simulation masking encryption pages | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / DLP and security/encryption-keys page: current version, rotation date, confirmed rotation reserved to tenant_admin and security_officer. |
| FRON-014 | P1 | SOC incidents Kill Switch recovery UI | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / SOC orders, Kill Switch convergence and four-eyes approvals tested. |
| FRON-015 | P1 | Observability traces logs metrics dashboards | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL; sources changed since evidence E-C11-LIVE / Traces, journal and live metrics (SSE) dashboards. |
| FRON-016 | P1 | Audit evidence and export pages | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / Audit reading restricted to the READERS in the menu and by URL. |
| FRON-017 | P1 | License support documentation and backup pages | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL; sources changed since evidence E-C11-LIVE / Support page (sanitized, audited bundles); backup = Backup and DR screen of lot C09. |
| FRON-018 | P1 | Accessibility responsive filters pagination | IN_PROGRESS | portal / audit: partial / Keyboard navigation and E2E not run: no DOM test environment (install forbidden) and browser checks not requested. / sources changed since evidence E-DF-PORTAL / Filters and pagination conformant; ResourceTable proven by vitest. |
| LICE-001 | P0 | License annual 12 months | IN_PROGRESS | licensing / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-LICENSING / 12 month EdDSA signed licence activated; other terms and inconsistent dates refused. |
| LICE-002 | P0 | License triennial 36 months | IN_PROGRESS | licensing / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-LICENSING / 36 month signed licence activated; test_terms_other_than_12_or_36_months_and_inconsistent_dates_are_refused. |
| LICE-003 | P0 | No limit users agents apps cases plugins | IN_PROGRESS | licensing / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-LICENSING / No counter; test_many_users_agents_and_plugins_under_one_licence; limit field refused. |
| LICE-004 | P0 | No prices anywhere | IN_PROGRESS | licensing / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-LICENSING / No price scan: catalog, contracts, docs, screens (test_licensing_no_price_scan); price refused in payload. |
| LICE-005 | P0 | Offline license issuance verification | IN_PROGRESS | licensing / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-LICENSING / Issuance and activation without network; test_verifier_and_store_never_reach_the_network. |
| LICE-006 | P0 | Install-group scope and DR portability | IN_PROGRESS | licensing / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-LICENSING / Installation group kept after DR restore, cluster migration and second site. |
| LICE-007 | P0 | Expiry grace no safety kill | IN_PROGRESS | licensing / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-CP-LICENSING / After grace only distribution.upgrade and marketplace.install are refused; security and audit stay active. |
| LICE-008 | P0 | Release version pinning components | FAILED | lock-manifest / audit: existing / failed evidence E-FL-RELEASE / Complete lock manifest and matching bundle (test_manifest_complete_against_lock_manifest). |
| LICE-009 | P0 | Airgap bundle images packages models SQL | FAILED | airgap / audit: existing / failed evidence E-FL-RELEASE / Install from the bundle in an empty network namespace (unshare -rn, needs an unsandboxed run). |
| LICE-010 | P0 | Cosign signatures Syft SBOM Trivy | FAILED | supply-chain / audit: existing / failed evidence E-FL-RELEASE / Real cosign, syft and trivy run; the trivy gate drives signing. |
| LICE-011 | P0 | Registry Harbor and CI Tekton | BLOCKED | Real publish then pull in Harbor through Tekton: cluster needed [B-CLUSTER] |
| LICE-012 | P0 | Git Gitea and GitOps ArgoCD | BLOCKED | Real Argo CD sync: cluster needed [B-CLUSTER] |
| LICE-013 | P0 | Kyverno Cilium KEDA HPA Helm | BLOCKED | In-cluster Kyverno, Cilium, KEDA, HPA controls [B-CLUSTER] |
| LICE-014 | P0 | Backup Velero and restoration | BLOCKED | Real Velero backup and restore [B-CLUSTER] |
| LICE-015 | P0 | Client installation handbook and release notes | FAILED | handbook-notes / audit: existing / failed evidence E-FL-RELEASE / FR and EN notes generated from the 1.0.0 lock manifest, deterministic; handbook shipped in the bundle. |
| LICE-016 | P0 | Support bundle safe and diagnostics | IN_PROGRESS | support-bundle / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-FL-SUPPORT / Real archive downloaded: secrets, e-mails and IP masked, no known sensitive value present. |
| DOCU-001 | P1 | Product and architecture docs | IN_PROGRESS | docs-architecture / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-DOCS / View, planes, flows (agent-run, kill-switch, planes diagrams) and decisions (27 ADRs, FR and EN by number). test_docs_kit checks the FR and EN pairs, relative links and quoted paths. |
| DOCU-002 | P1 | Install admin manager and runbook docs | IN_PROGRESS | docs-install-runbooks / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-DOCS; sources changed since evidence E-DO-NM-DOCS / Commands verified: every repository path quoted in backquotes exists, every python -m eai.* module exists, the licence CLI answers {activate,status}. navin-manager test_docs.py checks FR and EN pages of the same structure and links. |
| DOCU-003 | P1 | IAM policies delegation RLS security docs | IN_PROGRESS | docs-iam-security / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-DOCS; sources changed since evidence E-DO-REVOCATION; sources changed since evidence E-DO-FAIL-CLOSED / Tested examples: every route quoted in the security guides exists in the published OpenAPI (test_docs_kit); the described behaviours (restricted delegation, cascading revocation, RLS, fail closed) are replayed by test_identity_context_delegation and test_iam_fail_closed. |
| DOCU-004 | P1 | SDK Python TS Go and schema docs | IN_PROGRESS | docs-sdk / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-SDK-SNIPPETS; sources changed since evidence E-DO-DOCS; sources changed since evidence E-DD-GUIDES / test_doc_snippets_run executes every Python snippet of the docs against a mock server and checks each request is a route of the published surface. The TypeScript, Go and Java snippets of the SDK guides are compiled by test_developer_guides.py (tsc, go vet and go build, javac). |
| DOCU-005 | P1 | Plugin MCP skill prompt connector guide | IN_PROGRESS | docs-pack-guide / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-MARKETPLACE; sources changed since evidence E-DO-DOCS / The HR and Finance demo packs are built, signed, published and installed following the guide (real cosign toolchain) by test_marketplace; test_docs_kit checks the FR and EN pairs and links of the guide. |
| DOCU-006 | P1 | RAG multimodal voice data privacy docs | IN_PROGRESS | docs-rag-voice-privacy / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-DOCS; sources changed since evidence E-DO-ISOLATION; sources changed since evidence E-DO-VOICE / Dependency compliance clarified in LICENCES.md (FR and EN); RAG isolation and voice PII filtering replayed by test_rag_qdrant_real and test_realtime_voice_governance. |
| DOCU-007 | P1 | Observability SOC audit evidence docs | IN_PROGRESS | docs-soc-audit / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-DO-FAIL-CLOSED; sources changed since evidence E-DO-DOCS / Reproducible incident simulation: test_soc_ai_sdr replays an incident lifecycle (detection, Kill Switch, four-eyes recovery); test_evidence_gateway a detected tampering of a sealed event. |
| DOCU-008 | P1 | License annual triennial offline support docs | IN_PROGRESS | docs-licensing / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-DOCS; sources changed since evidence E-DO-LICENCE / No price (test_docs_kit and test_licensing_no_price_scan) and no usage limit (test_entitlements_never_count_...); annual and triennial licence, offline activation with the documented CLI (test_offline_issuance_...). |
| DOCU-009 | P1 | Airgap upgrades backup disaster recovery docs | FAILED | docs-airgap-dr / audit: existing / failed evidence E-DO-AIRGAP / Tests and limits documented: PostgreSQL backup and restore and offline install replayed; the limits (HA and DR on a real cluster) are written as BLOCKED in ha-dr.md. |
| DOCU-010 | P1 | API OpenAPI and CLI reference | IN_PROGRESS | docs-api-cli-reference / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-DOCS / Generated and versioned: python -m eai.api_openapi --check, python -m eai.api_surface --check and tools/cli/gen_reference.py --check (FR and EN) pass in test_generated_references_are_up_to_date. |
| DOCU-011 | P1 | Troubleshooting and compat matrix | IN_PROGRESS | docs-troubleshooting / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-DOCS; sources changed since evidence E-DO-NM-DOCS / Procedures verified: EAI_* settings of the reference read by the code, paths and links resolved, FR and EN component matrix. |
| DOCU-012 | P1 | Conformance and customer acceptance report | BLOCKED | The PASS FAIL BLOCKED report with evidence is generated (RELEASE_READINESS, TEST_EVIDENCE); its signature by the client is still to obtain [B-CLIENT]. |
| RELE-001 | P0 | Fresh cluster install automated | BLOCKED | Automated install on a blank acceptance Kubernetes cluster cannot be replayed here [B-CLUSTER]. |
| RELE-002 | P0 | BYO Kubernetes Postgres Redis storage | BLOCKED | Real client Kubernetes, PostgreSQL, Redis and storage not available [B-CLUSTER] [B-CLOUD]. |
| RELE-003 | P0 | No Internet airgap install | FAILED | airgap / audit: existing / failed evidence E-DO-AIRGAP / Packet egress equivalent: install inside unshare -rn (no network interface), signatures and SBOM verified offline. The run needs unprivileged user namespaces (outside the exec tool sandbox). |
| RELE-004 | P0 | Failure of OPA OpenFGA audit gateway | IN_PROGRESS | fail-closed / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-FAIL-CLOSED / Scenario 16: real OPA killed, real OpenFGA stopped, audit store unavailable: sensitive operations refused and the refusal audited; Audit Gateway target down: redelivery without loss or duplicate. |
| RELE-005 | P0 | Policy revocation while agent running | IN_PROGRESS | revocation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-REVOCATION / Scenario 6: revocation of the delegation, of the user or a policy change during the run: the next sensitive action is refused. |
| RELE-006 | P0 | Non-privileged user cannot see another tenant | IN_PROGRESS | tenant-isolation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-ISOLATION / Real security tests: cross-tenant IDOR on every route and real Qdrant with two tenants without leak (scenario 7). |
| RELE-007 | P0 | Bank financial operation retry idempotent | IN_PROGRESS | idempotency / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-SOC; sources changed since evidence E-DO-MARKETPLACE / Scenario 17: payment retried and killed in flight never executed twice; Finance pack with exactly-once payments. |
| RELE-008 | P0 | Secrets encrypted and PII out of logs | IN_PROGRESS | redaction / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-REDACTION / Redaction tests: secrets and PII absent from logs and spans, secrets stored encrypted, audit PII in the encrypted payload. |
| RELE-009 | P0 | Agent kill restart cannot resume unauthorized | IN_PROGRESS | kill-restart / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-SOC / Persistent suspension proven: the Kill Switch survives an application restart, recovery needs four eyes then reauthorization. |
| RELE-010 | P0 | Signed plugin unsafe permission denied | IN_PROGRESS | unsafe-plugin / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-MARKETPLACE / The Marketplace refuses a correctly signed pack (real cosign) asking for an unsafe permission. |
| RELE-011 | P0 | Voice consent and participant identity | BLOCKED | End to end WebRTC audio media (UDP, ICE, codecs) needs a WebRTC client [B-WEBRTC]. |
| RELE-012 | P0 | License expires without production cut | IN_PROGRESS | licence-expiry / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-LICENCE / Behaviour demonstrated: at expiry nothing stops in production, only the two documented actions are refused, warnings at 30, 7 and 1 days then grace. |
| RELE-013 | P0 | Backup restore evidence retention tested | IN_PROGRESS | backup-evidence / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-BACKUP / Scenario 20: real PostgreSQL backup then restore, the audit chain, seals and legal hold stay verifiable after restore. |
| RELE-014 | P0 | Performance HA scale and RTO RPO measured | BLOCKED | High availability, scale and node loss on a real cluster [B-CLUSTER]; RTO and RPO targets to be set by the client [B-CLIENT]. |
| RELE-015 | P0 | Developer first agent works day one | IN_PROGRESS | developer-day-one / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-DO-DAY-ONE / Template + SDK + docs succeed: login, create agent, validate, test authz (real opa), deploy, run start, events and trace against a real Control Plane, with the quickstart commands of cli.md, all present in the CLI reference. |
| RELE-016 | P0 | Docs and support handover complete | BLOCKED | Documentation and handover file delivered in FR and EN; the end to end acceptance signed by the client is still to obtain [B-CLIENT]. |
| HOST-001 | P0 | Inventaire hôtes VM bare metal et capacités CPU RAM GPU OS réseau | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS; sources changed since evidence E-HC-UI / test_inventory_reconciled_by_heartbeat_and_node_agents_view: CPU RAM GPU OS network capacities inventoried then reconciled by heartbeat. |
| HOST-002 | P0 | Préflight SSH OS DNS NTP disque ports et réseau | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Reproducible preflight report with blocking checks and warnings. |
| HOST-003 | P0 | SSH par clé Ed25519 ou certificats approuvés | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Against a real OpenSSH sshd: Ed25519 and approved CA certificate accepted, weak keys, password and root refused. |
| HOST-004 | P1 | Support RSA conditionnel selon politique client | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / RSA accepted only when the policy allows it and >= 3072 bits, otherwise refused. |
| HOST-005 | P0 | Strict SSH host key/certificate verification | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Unknown host or changed key refused on a real sshd; host certificate of the inventory CA accepted. |
| HOST-006 | P0 | SSH via bastion proxy jump et réseaux segmentés | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Bootstrap through a bastion (real ProxyJump) checking every host key. |
| HOST-007 | P0 | Compte bootstrap dédié et sudo allowlist sans root permanent | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Exact-command sudo allowlist validated by visudo, root refused. |
| HOST-008 | P0 | Références des clés et secrets uniquement dans PostgreSQL | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Scanner over the PostgreSQL dump and logs: no private key, references only. |
| HOST-009 | P0 | Binaire Node Agent signé digest vérifié et service systemd durci | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Signed package verified, tampered artifact rejected, hardened systemd unit. |
| HOST-010 | P0 | Bootstrap idempotent, rollback et suppression accès temporaires | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Rerun without double effects, temporary access removed, files rolled back on failure. |
| HOST-011 | P0 | Enrôlement par jeton unique court lié à un hôte | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Single-use enrolment token bound to the key: reuse and expiry refused. |
| HOST-012 | P0 | Identité SPIFFE et canal mTLS pour Node Agent | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / SPIFFE identity verified, certificate rotation, revoked certificate refused. |
| HOST-013 | P0 | Agent Node Go inventaire heartbeat métriques et diagnostics | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS; sources changed since evidence E-HC-UI; sources changed since evidence E-HC-AGENT-GO / Real Go agent: heartbeats, health and inventory through the API; NodeAgentsPage screen (vitest). |
| HOST-014 | P0 | Commandes agents signées allowlistées expirantes anti-rejeu | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS; sources changed since evidence E-HC-AGENT-GO / Real Go agent refuses invalid signature, replayed nonce, out-of-allowlist action, expired command. |
| HOST-015 | P0 | Commandes agents context identité et audit reçus réels | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Envelope carrying actor/tenant/trace and a verifiable redacted receipt. |
| HOST-016 | P0 | Mise en quarantaine désenrôlement et récupération machine | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Revocation blocks commands and renewal, audit emitted, recovery. |
| HOST-017 | P1 | Mise à jour sécurisée du Node Agent avec rollback | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS; sources changed since evidence E-HC-AGENT-GO / TestRealBinaryUpdateRolledBackWithoutHeartbeat builds the real nm-agent, swaps in a signed binary, then the real previous binary (ExecStartPre update-check) restores itself without a heartbeat keeping the inventory state; confirmation after heartbeat; tampered package refused. |
| HOST-018 | P0 | Break glass SSH approuvé et audité | IN_PROGRESS | host-bootstrap / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS / Two approvers, TTL, intervention evidence and revocation. |
| CLUS-001 | P0 | Six modes single host node group K8s existing K8s managed multi cluster external | BLOCKED | Kubernetes mode operations on real kubelets and real multi-cluster [B-CLUSTER] |
| CLUS-002 | P0 | Distinction platform managed et client managed | IN_PROGRESS | cluster-placement / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-PLACEMENT / Destructive actions refused automatically on CLIENT_MANAGED (API and operator). |
| CLUS-003 | P0 | Import Kubernetes via API sans SSH et permissions minimales | FAILED | cluster-agent / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HC-K8S / E2E import through the API against envtest with least RBAC, no SSH. |
| CLUS-004 | P0 | Cluster Agent Go répliqué et identité par cluster | FAILED | cluster-agent / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HC-K8S / Replica loss without loss of control (envtest lease), tokens isolated per cluster. |
| CLUS-005 | P0 | Cluster Agent connexion sortante mTLS et autonomie contrôlée offline | FAILED | cluster-agent / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HC-K8S / Offline: desired state kept, new sensitive operations refused. |
| CLUS-006 | P0 | Platform Operator CRDs schémas et reconciliation | FAILED | cluster-agent / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HC-K8S / Reconcile install, upgrade, drift, controlled delete on envtest. |
| CLUS-007 | P0 | Node pools CPU GPU labels et placement contraint | BLOCKED | actual pod placement on real GPU/CPU nodes [B-CLUSTER] |
| CLUS-008 | P0 | ManagedComponent manifest des modes opérations dépendances et sécurité | FAILED | cluster-agent / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HC-K8S / ManagedComponent schema validated (CRD) and API/operator integration on envtest. |
| CLUS-009 | P0 | DAG dépendances services ordre et maintenance | IN_PROGRESS | cluster-placement / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-PLACEMENT / Start/stop follow the dependency DAG, critical cases refused. |
| CLUS-010 | P0 | Séparation service start/stop et security suspension | IN_PROGRESS | cluster-placement / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-PLACEMENT / The kill switch stays active after a service restart. |
| CLUS-011 | P1 | Capacity planning CPU RAM GPU et quotas par pool | IN_PROGRESS | cluster-placement / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-PLACEMENT / Saturation alerts and an unfeasible plan is blocked. |
| CLUS-012 | P0 | Gestion de plusieurs clusters et perte de connexion WAN | BLOCKED | several real clusters separated by a WAN [B-CLUSTER] |
| HAVA-001 | P0 | Profils standalone ha critical ha et choix de fault domains | FAILED | availability / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-HA / test_profiles_and_unsupported_modes: standalone, ha, critical-ha profiles and limits declared; availability screen (vitest) shows them; values-ha.yaml carries them. |
| HAVA-002 | P0 | Frontend backend Manager gateway répliqués en HA | BLOCKED | real frontend/API/worker/Manager replica failure under load [B-CLUSTER] |
| HAVA-003 | P0 | HA Identity Policy Context Authority et Security Controllers | BLOCKED | real IAM/policy replica failure [B-CLUSTER] |
| HAVA-004 | P0 | HA Audit Evidence SOC Kill Switch et Licensing | BLOCKED | real central Manager and SOC loss on a cluster [B-CLUSTER] |
| HAVA-005 | P0 | Topology spread affinity PDB et drains planifiés | BLOCKED | real PDB-compatible node and zone drain [B-CLUSTER] |
| HAVA-006 | P0 | Leader election et anti-double opération exclusive | FAILED | availability / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-HA / test_two_processes_race_one_wins: two processes race for the lease, only one wins; test_lease_exclusive_and_fencing: fencing token. |
| HAVA-007 | P0 | HA PostgreSQL sous K8s via CloudNativePG | BLOCKED | real CloudNativePG operator failover [B-CLUSTER] |
| HAVA-008 | P0 | HA PostgreSQL VM via Patroni ou client-managed | FAILED | availability / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-HA / test_patroni_etcd_election_failover_fencing_rejoin: real Patroni + etcd, election, fencing and rejoin of the old primary. |
| HAVA-009 | P0 | HA Redis Sentinel ou Cluster et reconnexion clients | FAILED | availability / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-HA / test_redis_sentinel_failover: real Redis Sentinel, primary killed, new primary elected, client reconnects via SENTINEL get-master-addr-by-name, lost keys counted (asynchronous replication, zero loss not claimed). |
| HAVA-010 | P0 | HA NATS JetStream quorum et redelivery idempotent | FAILED | availability / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-HA / test_nats_jetstream_r3_member_loss: real JetStream R3, member loss, quorum kept, duplicate refused (Nats-Msg-Id), redelivery processed once (100 unique messages). |
| HAVA-011 | P0 | HA Temporal persistence et jobs durables | BLOCKED | multi-replica Temporal HA [B-CLUSTER] |
| HAVA-012 | P0 | HA des dépendances Keycloak LiteLLM Opik OpenFGA Qdrant OpenSearch | BLOCKED | real HA of the dependencies at pinned versions [B-CLUSTER] |
| HAVA-013 | P1 | HA OTel Collector Prometheus Alertmanager | BLOCKED | real OTel/Prometheus/Alertmanager replica failure [B-CLUSTER] |
| HAVA-014 | P0 | HA LiveKit avec limites de reconnexion rooms | BLOCKED | real LiveKit node loss with a WebRTC client [B-CLUSTER] [B-WEBRTC] |
| HAVA-015 | P1 | HA vLLM et capacity GPU failover | BLOCKED | real vLLM failover [B-GPU] [B-CLUSTER] |
| HAVA-016 | P0 | Fail closed sécurité en panne control plane | FAILED | availability / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-HA / test_fail_closed_when_audit_unavailable / _database_unavailable: critical action refused when audit or database is unavailable. |
| HAVA-017 | P0 | Observabilité HA distinction configured versus validated | FAILED | availability / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-HA / test_create_group_configured_never_validated_until_run: HA_CONFIGURED becomes HA_VALIDATED only after a recorded failover run; quorum and WAN loss; the screen (vitest) shows runs, quorum, observed figures and unset targets. |
| HAVA-018 | P1 | Autoscaling horizontal KEDA HPA et politique de quotas | BLOCKED | real KEDA/HPA scale-up and stable return [B-CLUSTER] |
| BACK-001 | P0 | Backup Manager central plans restauration permissions et historique | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Plans, targets, backups, restores, permissions (backup:read, separate restore privilege), history and audit: API tests on PostgreSQL + Backup Center screen (vitest). |
| BACK-002 | P0 | Storage adapter S3 Azure GCS IBM Seaweed BYO | BLOCKED | Azure, GCS, IBM COS adapters against real providers [B-CLOUD] |
| BACK-003 | P0 | Qualification capabilities versioning ObjectLock legal hold native | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / test_worm_policy_fails_closed_without_verified_capability: WORM policy refused when Object Lock is not verified; never a simulated WORM. |
| BACK-004 | P0 | Velero backup Kubernetes manifests CRDs volumes compatibles | BLOCKED | real Velero backup and restore [B-CLUSTER] |
| BACK-005 | P0 | PostgreSQL backup cohérent CNPG ou pgBackRest selon mode | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Real pgBackRest: full backup, restore and data check; CNPG mode: manifest validated (CNPG execution falls under HAVA-007/BACK-004). |
| BACK-006 | P0 | PostgreSQL WAL continu et Point in Time Recovery | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / test_basebackup_wal_archive_and_point_in_time_recovery: real WAL archiving, PITR to the test point, later rows absent. |
| BACK-007 | P0 | Snapshots etcd et procédure restore control plane | BLOCKED | real Kubernetes control plane rebuild [B-CLUSTER] |
| BACK-008 | P0 | Backup OpenSearch via snapshots natifs | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Real OpenSearch: snapshot to an fs repository, restore into a new index, control queries. |
| BACK-009 | P0 | Backup Qdrant via snapshots natifs | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Real Qdrant: native snapshot, collection restored, ACL payloads preserved. |
| BACK-010 | P0 | Backup Opik et backends MySQL Redis ClickHouse object storage selon distro | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Coordinated Opik plan and real Redis RDB backup/restore; Opik traces (ClickHouse 25.3.3.42, native BACKUP and RESTORE DATABASE) and Opik state (MySQL 8.4.5, mysqldump --single-transaction with triggers) backed up then restored into fresh servers at the versions pinned in the Manager catalogue, digests read back identical, restore over an existing database refused; official binaries checked by tools/backup/fetch.sh (ClickHouse release sha512, MySQL GPG signature). |
| BACK-011 | P0 | Backup Temporal NATS JetStream et checkpoints agents | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Real JetStream stream backed up/restored, Temporal history restored, agent checkpoints inside the PostgreSQL scope. |
| BACK-012 | P0 | Backup OCI Harbor manifests prompts skills plugins policies modèles | BLOCKED | backup and reload of a real Harbor (projects, robot accounts, replication) impossible here, Harbor ships only as container images (core, jobservice, registry) with no standalone binary, and Docker, Podman and root are absent [B-DOCKER] |
| BACK-013 | P0 | Backup secrets certificats CA et processus key recovery | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / test_secrets_archive_needs_the_separate_custody_key: encrypted secrets archive, restore impossible without the separate custody key, keys never exposed. |
| BACK-014 | P0 | Cohérence transverse DB objets registres versions | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Consistency report listing and reconciling orphan references. |
| BACK-015 | P0 | Chiffrement backup rétention et séparation de privilèges | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Encryption and checksum, retention enforced, separate restore privilege. |
| BACK-016 | P0 | Backup WORM preuves d audit immuables sur backend qualifié | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Real SeaweedFS with Object Lock: delete and overwrite refused during retention. |
| BACK-017 | P0 | Tests réguliers automatiques restore isolé et intégrité | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Periodic restore test: signed report, alarm on corruption. |
| BACK-018 | P0 | Backup policies monitoring retards erreurs et alertes | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Late or failed backups: operational alerts and audit events. |
| BACK-019 | P0 | Restore approval dry-run plan et rollback de configuration | FAILED | backup / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Restore impossible without two distinct approvers, incompatible plan (major version) refused, rollback on corruption, dry run. |
| DR-001 | P0 | DR sites primary secondary multi cluster et rôles | FAILED | disaster-recovery / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Primary/secondary sites and link state exposed and validated; Disaster Recovery screen (vitest). |
| DR-002 | P0 | Modes active passive warm cold et active active stateless | BLOCKED | real second site for active-passive and active-active [B-CLUSTER] [B-CLIENT] |
| DR-003 | P0 | Fencing ancien primary et prevention split brain | FAILED | disaster-recovery / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP; failed evidence E-HB-HA / test_old_primary_fenced_before_promotion_no_double_write: old primary fenced before promotion, write refused, no double write. |
| DR-004 | P0 | Plan recovery séquencé données identités gateways modèles | FAILED | disaster-recovery / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP; failed evidence E-HB-HA / Recovery DAG run on local processes in dependency order, state and evidence recorded. |
| DR-005 | P0 | Reconstruire Manager depuis bundle offline backups et manifests | FAILED | disaster-recovery / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Manager rebuilt from the offline bundle and backups, without the vendor server. |
| DR-006 | P0 | DNS load balancer routes reconfiguration failover | BLOCKED | real reconfiguration of the client's DNS and load balancer [B-CLIENT] |
| DR-007 | P0 | RPO RTO objectifs client et valeurs observées | BLOCKED | RPO/RTO targets to be set by the client; measurement on a real site [B-CLIENT] |
| DR-008 | P0 | DR tests planifiés avec approbation et preuves | FAILED | disaster-recovery / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Exercise approved by a third party, run, evidence and measurements recorded; runbook docs/operations/ha-dr.md. |
| DR-009 | P0 | Licence 12 36 mois reste valide pendant DR et mode offline | FAILED | disaster-recovery / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Group licence valid after offline DR, without vendor contact. |
| DR-010 | P0 | Audit identités suspensions et permissions préservés pendant DR | FAILED | disaster-recovery / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP; failed evidence E-HB-HA / Audit, identities, permissions and kill switch suspension identical after rebuild. |
| DR-011 | P0 | Réconciliation post failover empêche doubles paiements | FAILED | disaster-recovery / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / Post-failover reconciliation using external receipts: no double payment. |
| INFUI-001 | P0 | UI hosts preflight SSH bootstrap et enrôlement | IN_PROGRESS | manager-console / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HB-E2E; sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI; sources changed since evidence E-NM-INFRA-HOSTS / nodes.test.tsx "previews the sudo allowlist, shows the preflight and blocks the start on blocking errors" (console); test_machine_to_verified_restore chains real SSH bootstrap, enrolment and SQL. |
| INFUI-002 | P0 | UI node agents heartbeats certificats et révocation | IN_PROGRESS | manager-console / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS; sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI; sources changed since evidence E-NM-INFRA-HOSTS / nodes.test.tsx "shows heartbeat, identity, rotation and trust, and quarantines a node"; test_hosts_heartbeat checks the server-side state. |
| INFUI-003 | P0 | UI clusters pools placement et dépendances | IN_PROGRESS | manager-console / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-HC-HOSTS; sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI / wizard.test.tsx proves the controllable placement plan (cardinalities, server errors). |
| INFUI-004 | P0 | UI HA replicas quorum failover et fault domains | IN_PROGRESS | manager-console / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI; sources changed since evidence E-NM-HA / availability.test.tsx "shows configured as not validated" distinguishes configured from validated state and runs a failover test. |
| INFUI-005 | P0 | UI backups policies jobs historiques et tests | IN_PROGRESS | manager-console / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI; sources changed since evidence E-NM-BACKUP-DR / backup.test.tsx "Backup Center shows policies, alerts, history"; execution evidence comes from test_backup_recovery. |
| INFUI-006 | P0 | UI Restore dry run approve execute verify | IN_PROGRESS | manager-console / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI; sources changed since evidence E-NM-BACKUP-DR / backup.test.tsx "Restore Center dry run lists approvers"; test_backup_recovery refuses execution without approval. |
| INFUI-007 | P0 | UI PRA sites objectifs exercices et résultats | FAILED | manager-console / audit: existing / failed evidence E-HB-BACKUP / backup.test.tsx "Disaster Recovery shows unset targets, observed values"; test_backup_dr_extended runs the exercise and planned failover. |
| INFUI-008 | P0 | UI client-managed actions non autorisées cachées et refusées backend | IN_PROGRESS | manager-console / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-UI; sources changed since evidence E-NM-HA / nodes.test.tsx and availability.test.tsx hide client-managed actions; test_client_managed_destructive_refused proves the refusal on a direct API call. |
| INFSDK-001 | P0 | SDK Python TS Go hosts bootstrap enrollment diagnostics | IN_PROGRESS | manager-sdk / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK-TS; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK-GO; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER / The three SDKs are generated from manager-openapi.json and tested route by route (hosts, bootstrap, enrolment, diagnostics). |
| INFSDK-002 | P0 | SDK Python TS Go clusters et services operations | IN_PROGRESS | manager-sdk / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK-TS; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK-GO; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK-REAL / The request-shape tests of the three SDKs cover clusters and services. |
| INFSDK-003 | P0 | SDK Python TS Go HA backups restore DR | IN_PROGRESS | manager-sdk / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK-TS; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK-GO; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK-REAL / Full coverage of HA, backup, restore and DR operations in the three SDKs. |
| INFSDK-004 | P0 | Contexte user identity on behalf of service delegation pour operations | IN_PROGRESS | manager-delegation / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SERVER; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK-TS; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK-GO / test_service_token_with_delegate_acts_on_behalf_and_is_audited checks the audit actor and on_behalf_of; test_on_behalf_of_refused_without_explicit_delegate refuses any unauthorised delegation. |
| INFSDK-005 | P0 | CLI host cluster services ha backup restore dr | IN_PROGRESS | manager-cli / audit: existing / sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK; sources changed since evidence E-MG-SDK-REAL / test_every_cli_command_calls_its_route covers host, cluster, service, ha, backup, restore, dr; test_cli_help_is_offline_and_bilingual proves offline help. |