A06 - Policy Engine
| Group | Technology | Status | Service | Roadmap phase | Contracts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A - Governance, identity and security | OPA (Rego) | open source integrated | policies | 1 | policy-contract |
Role and responsibilities
Evaluates Policy Contract requests and returns allow/deny with reasons and obligations.
Data model
Tables (schema eai, every tenant table carries tenant_id uuid NOT NULL with an RLS policy on current_setting('app.tenant_id', true)::uuid): eai.policies, eai.policy_decisions, eai.audit_events.
API endpoints
GET /v1/policiesPOST /v1/policiesGET /v1/policies/{id}PUT /v1/policies/{id}DELETE /v1/policies/{id}POST /v1/policies/evaluate
POST /v1/policies HTTP/1.1
Host: <control-plane-host>
X-API-Key: eai_xxx_secret
Accept-Language: en
Content-Type: application/json
{"name": "block-secret-data", "description": "Deny access to data classified secret", "engine": "builtin", "priority": 100, "status": "draft"}
{
"id": "2a924df1-cbc2-44ab-90c4-149fbe12687c",
"tenant_id": "18de5695-21f9-4053-a4ea-beb4bf2a5932",
"name": "block-secret-data",
"description": "Deny access to data classified secret",
"version": "1.0.0",
"engine": "builtin",
"rego": null,
"rules": [],
"priority": 100,
"status": "draft",
"created_by": "alice",
"created_at": "2026-10-30T02:35:52.728469+01:00",
"updated_at": "2026-10-30T02:35:52.728469+01:00"
}
Errors use the common envelope {"error": {"code", "message", "message_i18n", "details", "request_id"}}; lists are paginated with limit and cursor.
SDK usage
Python (enterprise_ai):
from enterprise_ai import EnterpriseAI
client = EnterpriseAI(base_url="<control-plane-url>", api_key="eai_xxx_secret")
items = client.policies.list()
TypeScript (@enterprise-ai/sdk):
import { EnterpriseAI } from "@enterprise-ai/sdk";
const eai = new EnterpriseAI({ baseUrl: "<control-plane-url>", apiKey: process.env.EAI_API_KEY });
const items = await eai.policies.list();
Java (enterprise-ai-java):
EnterpriseAIClient client = EnterpriseAIClient.builder()
.baseUrl("<control-plane-url>")
.apiKey(System.getenv("EAI_API_KEY"))
.build();
var items = client.policies().list();
Go (enterprise-ai-go):
client, _ := eai.NewClient(eai.WithBaseURL("<control-plane-url>"), eai.WithAPIKey(os.Getenv("EAI_API_KEY")))
items, err := client.Policies.List(ctx)
Configuration
- Environment:
EAI_DATABASE_URL,EAI_OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT. - Helm values:
controlPlane.enabled,controlPlane.replicas,controlPlane.resources,controlPlane.config.
Security controls
- Authentication by OIDC JWT, tenant API key with scopes, or SPIFFE mTLS; tenant resolved from the credential, never from the body.
- Authorization through OpenFGA and OPA decisions; every mutation and decision writes a hash-chained
eai.audit_eventsrow. - Secrets never returned by the API; TLS everywhere; Cilium network policies restrict who can reach the service.
Observability
- Metrics:
eai_policy_engine_requests_total,eai_policy_engine_errors_total,eai_policy_engine_latency_seconds(Prometheus). - Traces: OpenTelemetry spans
eai.policies.*with W3Ctraceparentpropagation, AI spans forwarded to Opik. - Audit actions:
policy.create,policy.update,policy.delete,policy.simulate,policy.evaluate.
FinOps aspects
Operating cost is allocated per tenant and project through labels on Usage Events and Kubernetes resource requests; no direct per-call cost.
Failure modes and resilience
- Stateless replicas behind the API Gateway, PostgreSQL HA for state; readiness probe
GET /readyzremoves unhealthy pods. - External system unavailable: fail closed for security decisions, explicit error code, no silent bypass.
Standalone adoption (client of a client)
A client of a client can adopt this brick alone with the Python SDK sub-client client.policies (TS eai.policies, Java client.policies(), Go client.Policies). Minimal deployment: Control Plane API + PostgreSQL + Keycloak (or API keys), the Control Plane loads every domain of services/control-plane/src/eai/domains; the optional chart components are switched off in deploy/helm/enterprise-ai/values.yaml (vllm.enabled, qdrant.enabled, nats.enabled, workers.enabled).
Acceptance tests
- A tenant cannot read or modify another tenant's resources (RLS test).
- Every mutation produces an audit event verifiable by
GET /v1/audit/verify. - Errors are returned in English and French according to
Accept-Language.
Evidence on real components
See the identity and policy plane guide: components started from the official releases (tools/iam/fetch.sh), tests services/control-plane/tests/test_iam_*.py.