A04 - Machine Identity
| Group | Technology | Status | Service | Roadmap phase | Contracts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A - Governance, identity and security | SPIFFE/SPIRE | open source integrated | identity | 2 | - |
Role and responsibilities
Workload identities (SVID), mTLS between gateways, runtimes and services.
Data model
Tables (schema eai, every tenant table carries tenant_id uuid NOT NULL with an RLS policy on current_setting('app.tenant_id', true)::uuid): eai.service_identities, eai.audit_events.
API endpoints
GET /v1/service-identitiesPOST /v1/service-identitiesDELETE /v1/service-identities/{id}
POST /v1/service-identities HTTP/1.1
Host: <control-plane-host>
X-API-Key: eai_xxx_secret
Accept-Language: en
Content-Type: application/json
{"name": "invoice-agent", "spiffe_id": "spiffe://acme.example/ns/agents/sa/invoice-agent", "roles": ["agent"], "scopes": ["tools:invoke"], "clearance": "internal"}
{
"id": "b73f684f-e762-4535-8e45-904aefefcdf4",
"tenant_id": "18de5695-21f9-4053-a4ea-beb4bf2a5932",
"name": "invoice-agent",
"spiffe_id": "spiffe://acme.example/ns/agents/sa/invoice-agent",
"roles": ["agent"],
"scopes": ["tools:invoke"],
"clearance": "internal",
"status": "active",
"created_by": "alice",
"created_at": "2026-10-30T02:35:52.713372+01:00"
}
Errors use the common envelope {"error": {"code", "message", "message_i18n", "details", "request_id"}}; lists are paginated with limit and cursor.
SDK usage
Python (enterprise_ai):
from enterprise_ai import EnterpriseAI
client = EnterpriseAI(base_url="<control-plane-url>", api_key="eai_xxx_secret")
items = client.identity.list_service_identities()
TypeScript (@enterprise-ai/sdk):
import { EnterpriseAI } from "@enterprise-ai/sdk";
const eai = new EnterpriseAI({ baseUrl: "<control-plane-url>", apiKey: process.env.EAI_API_KEY });
const items = await eai.serviceIdentities.list();
Java (enterprise-ai-java):
EnterpriseAIClient client = EnterpriseAIClient.builder()
.baseUrl("<control-plane-url>")
.apiKey(System.getenv("EAI_API_KEY"))
.build();
var items = client.serviceIdentities().list();
Go (enterprise-ai-go):
client, _ := eai.NewClient(eai.WithBaseURL("<control-plane-url>"), eai.WithAPIKey(os.Getenv("EAI_API_KEY")))
items, err := client.ServiceIdentities.List(ctx)
Configuration
- Environment:
EAI_DATABASE_URL,EAI_OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT. - Helm values:
controlPlane.enabled,controlPlane.replicas,controlPlane.resources,controlPlane.config.
Security controls
- Authentication by OIDC JWT, tenant API key with scopes, or SPIFFE mTLS; tenant resolved from the credential, never from the body.
- Authorization through OpenFGA and OPA decisions; every mutation and decision writes a hash-chained
eai.audit_eventsrow. - Secrets never returned by the API; TLS everywhere; Cilium network policies restrict who can reach the service.
Observability
- Metrics:
eai_machine_identity_requests_total,eai_machine_identity_errors_total,eai_machine_identity_latency_seconds(Prometheus). - Traces: OpenTelemetry spans
eai.service_identities.*with W3Ctraceparentpropagation, AI spans forwarded to Opik. - Audit actions:
service_identity.create,service_identity.delete,api_key.create,api_key.rotate,policy.evaluate.
FinOps aspects
Operating cost is allocated per tenant and project through labels on Usage Events and Kubernetes resource requests; no direct per-call cost.
Failure modes and resilience
- Stateless replicas behind the API Gateway, PostgreSQL HA for state; readiness probe
GET /readyzremoves unhealthy pods. - External system unavailable: fail closed for security decisions, explicit error code, no silent bypass.
Standalone adoption (client of a client)
A client of a client can adopt this brick alone with the Python SDK sub-client client.identity (TS eai.serviceIdentities, Java client.serviceIdentities(), Go client.ServiceIdentities). Minimal deployment: Control Plane API + PostgreSQL + Keycloak (or API keys), the Control Plane loads every domain of services/control-plane/src/eai/domains; the optional chart components are switched off in deploy/helm/enterprise-ai/values.yaml (vllm.enabled, qdrant.enabled, nats.enabled, workers.enabled).
Acceptance tests
- A tenant cannot read or modify another tenant's resources (RLS test).
- Every mutation produces an audit event verifiable by
GET /v1/audit/verify. - Errors are returned in English and French according to
Accept-Language.
Evidence on real components
See the identity and policy plane guide: components started from the official releases (tools/iam/fetch.sh), tests services/control-plane/tests/test_iam_*.py.